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I am a physicist, and we physicists are trying to find and understand at least one theory that will give a good description and explanation of our universe. It is typically preferred that such a theory have simple principles, an elegant form, and yet make precise statements. For these purposes, mathematical theories are often the ideal.
On the other hand, physics is usually regarded as necessarily resting upon observations (in contrast to, say, pure mathematics, which in principle can be divorced from experience, though in practice it too is usually based on observed patterns).
However, observations themselves seem less simple, elegant, and precise than what physicists would often want for their theories. I am of the opinion that this is one of the causes for the tendency to regard the simple, elegant, and precise elements of theories of physics as more real than the apparently complex, sometimes ugly, and usually imprecise observations that we pay lip service to as the foundation of physics. Whatever we cannot understand in terms of the simple, elegant, precise elements of our mathematical theories, we tend to dismiss as less real.
In particular, I personally regard my own first-person subjective experience of consciousness as overwhelming evidence of its existence, but its apparent complexity, inelegance, and imprecision often seems to lead many physicists to dismiss it as less real than, say, elementary particles, spacetime, or quantum states. I am not at all decrying simplicity, elegance, and precision, which I do take to be extremely important, but I also do not wish to dismiss such a central feature of our experience as consciousness.
In fact, I take the observations that are considered to be the foundation of physics to be most simply and fundamentally conscious perceptions. This viewpoint raises the question of how consciousness is related to the structures that are more common in current theories of physics. In particular, the most fundamental structure of many of the current theories of physics is the quantum framework. Although we cannot be certain that our universe really is quantum, such a hypothesis helps explain so much of both our present theories and our observations that I shall take it as one of my central working hypotheses, along with the hypothesis of the existence of conscious perceptions.
In view of our desire to formulate the most simple, elegant, precise theories possible, I am not be content with leaving these two fundamental hypotheses unrelated but instead want to integrate them together. How might that be done?
Here I wish to describe and explore a framework I have developed for relating consciousness and the quantum, which I have called Sensible Quantum Mechanics (Page, 1995) or Mindless Sensationalism (Page, 2003) . I should emphasize that this is so far just a framework, since the details to make it into a proper precise theory
are not yet known. But even just the framework itself has various consequences that may be explored.
Because Sensible Quantum Mechanics builds upon quantum theory, I should first say what I regard that pillar to be. I regard the essence of quantum theory to be a C * -algebra of quantum operators and a quantum state that gives expectation values to each operator.
I cannot go into precise details here, but let me give a crude dscription of these elements. Quantum operators are mathematical entities that may be adjointed, The other pillar of Sensible Quantum Mechanics is consciousness. I shall assume
here that there is a countable discrete set M of all possible conscious experiences or perceptions p. By a "conscious experience," I mean all that one is consciously aware of or consciously experiencing at once. Lockwood (2003) has called this a "phenomenal perspective" or "maximal experience" or "conscious state." It could also be expressed as a total "raw feel" that one has at once.
Because I regard the basic conscious entities to be the conscious experiences themselves, which might crudely be called sensations if one does not restrict the meaning of this word to be the conscious responses only to external stimuli, and because I doubt that these conscious experiences are arranged in any strictly defined sequences that one might define to be minds if they did exist, my framework has sensations without minds and hence may be labeled Mindless Sensationalism (Page, 2003) . In this way the framework of Mindless Sensationalism proposed here is a particular manifestation of Hume's ideas (Hume, 1988) , that "what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity" (p. 207), and that the self is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions" (p. 252). As he explains in the Appendix (p. 634), "When I turn my reflexion on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. 'Tis the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self." (Here I should note that what Hume calls a perception may be only one component of the "phenomenal perspective" or "maximal experience" (Lockwood, 1989 ) that I have been calling a perception or conscious experience p, so one of my p's can include "one or more perceptions" in Hume's sense.)
I should also emphasize that by a conscious experience, I mean the phenomenal, first-person, "internal" subjective experience, and not the unconscious "external" physical processes in the brain that accompany these subjective phenomena. In his first chapter, Chalmers (1996) gives an excellent discussion of the distinction between the former, which he calls the phenomenal concept of mind, and the latter, which he calls the psychological concept of mind. In his language, what I mean by a conscious experience (and by other approximate synonyms that I might use, such as perception or sensation or awareness) is the phenomenal concept, and not the psychological one.
The next idea is that not all possible conscious perceptions p occur equally, but that there is a normalized measure w(p) associated with each one (a nonnegative real number which sums to unity when one adds up the values for all the p's in the full set M). This measure in some sense gives the level or degree of reality that the conscious perception p has. Perceptions with large measures have high degrees of reality, whereas perceptions with very low measures have tiny degrees of reality and effectively can be ignored. One can also say that the weight w(p) is analogous to the probability for the conscious experience p, but it is not to be interpreted as the probability for the bare existence of p, since any conscious experience p exists (is actually experienced) if its weight is positive, w(p) > 0. Rather, w(p) is to be interpreted as being proportional to the probability of getting this particular experience if a random selection were made.
Because the specification of the conscious experience p completely determines its content and how it is experienced (how it feels), the weight w(p) has absolutely no effect on that-there is absolutely no way within the experience to sense anything directly of what the weight is. A toothache within a particular conscious experience p is precisely as painful an experience no matter what w(p) is. It is just that an experience with a greater w(p) has a greater degree of existence and is more likely in the sense of being more probably chosen by a random selection using the weights
Finally, Sensible Quantum Mechanics assumes the connection between consciousness and the quantum in the form that for each conscious perception p, there is an associated quantum "awareness operator" A(p), and that the measure for the conscious perception p is the expectation value, in the quantum state of the universe, of the corresponding experience operator, w(p) = σ[E(p)].
One can summarize this by saying that Sensible Quantum Mechanics or Mindless
Sensationalism is given by the following three basic postulates or axioms (Page, 1995 (Page, , 2003 :
Quantum World Axiom: The "quantum world" Q is completely described by an appropriate C * -algebra of operators O and by a suitable state σ (a positive linear functional of the operators) giving the expectation value σ[O] of each operator O.
Conscious World Axiom:
The "conscious world" M, the countable discrete set of all conscious experiences or perceptions p, has a fundamental normalized measure w(p) for each perception p.
Psycho-Physical Parallelism Axiom: The measure w(p) for each conscious experience p is given by the expectation value of a corresponding quantum "awareness operator" A(p) in the state σ of the quantum world,
One might note that in comparison with the more general assumptions of (Page, 1995 (Page, , 2003 , here for simplicity I am making the more restrictive hypothesis that the set M of all conscious perceptions p is a countable discrete set. I am also assuming that the measure is normalized, p w(p) = 1.
The Psycho-Physical Parallelism Axiom is the simplest way I know to connect the quantum world with the conscious world. One could easily imagine more complicated connections, such as having w(p) be a nonlinear function of the expectation values, say m(p), of a positive "experience operator" E(p) depending on the p (Page, 1995 (Page, , 2003 . Instead, my Psycho-Physical Parallelism Axiom restricts the function to be linear in the expectation values. In short, I am proposing that the psychophysical parallelism is linear.
Of course, the Psycho-Physical Parallelism Axiom, like the Quantum World Axiom, is here also deliberately vague as to the form of the awareness operators A(p), because I do not have a detailed theory of consciousness, but only a framework for fitting it with quantum theory. My suggestion is that a theory of consciousness that is not inconsistent with bare quantum theory should be formulated within this framework. I am also suspicious of any present detailed theory that purports to say precisely under what conditions in the quantum world consciousness occurs, since it seems that we simply don't know yet. I feel that present detailed theories may be analogous to the cargo cults of the South Pacific after World War II, in which an incorrect theory was adopted, that aircraft with goods would land simply if airfields and towers were built.
Since all conscious perceptions p with w(p) > 0 really occur in the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics or Mindless Sensationalism, it is completely deterministic if the quantum state and the awareness operators A(p) are determined: there are no random or truly probabilistic elements in SQM or MS. Neither is there any free will in the incompatibilist sense, and consciousness may be viewed as an epiphenomenon (Page, 1995 (Page, , 2003 . Nevertheless, because the framework has normalized measures w(p) for conscious perceptions, these can be interpreted as probabilities for the perceptions, given the theory. In particular, one can interpret the measure w i (p j ) that a theory T i assigns to one's particular perception p j as the likelihood of the theory. Then if one assigns different SQM or MS theories prior probabilities P (T i ), one can use Bayes' theorem to calculate the posterior probability of the theory, given the observation or conscious perception p j , as P (
In this way different SQM or MS theories are testable.
A major problem at the frontier of theoretical cosmology is essentially to develop one or more theories that give the measures w(p) for conscious perceptions, except that most theorists are hesitant to focus on conscious perceptions and hence ask for the probability of an observation O j given a theory T i , P (O j |T i ). It is usually left rather vague what is supposed to constitute an observation. For me the most fundamental entities that can be identified with observations are conscious perceptions, so I would take P (O j |T i ) to be w i (p j ), the normalized measure that theory T i assigns to the conscious perception p j . In Sensible Quantum Mechanics, a theory T i would assign an awareness operator A j = A(p j ) to each conscious perception and give a quantum state σ i so that For theorists hesitant to identify observations with conscious perceptions, they may still wish to say that the probability of an observation O j given a theory T i is
. In this generalized view, A j is simply the operator in the theory T i whose expectation value in the quantum state given by that theory gives the probability of the observation O j .
Quantum theories of this generalized form (whether or not an observation is taken to be a conscious perception) can be considered to have three parts: (1) the algebra of the full set of quantum operators, (2) the quantum state σ i , and (3) the particular operators A j for each observation (or for each conscious perception in Sensible Quantum Mechanics or Mindless Sensationalism). Part (1) includes the dynamical laws of physics, which historically have often been naïvely called a 'Theory of Everything' or TOE, though it certainly is not. Part (2) includes the boundary conditions that specify which solution of the dynamical laws describes our actual universe, but even Part (1) augmented with Part (2) is not sufficient. Part (3) includes the rules for extracting the probabilities of observations from the quantum state.
The logical independence of Part (3) is becoming widely recognized with the measure problem of cosmology (Linde, 1986; Garcia-Bellido et al., 1994; Vilenkin, 1995a,b; Guth, 2000; Tegmark 2005; Aguirre, 2007; De Simone et al., 2008; Linde & Noorbala, 2010; Bousso et al., 2010) . If a universe had a definite number N j of occurrences (each occurrence with the same degree of reality) of each kind of observation O j , and a finite total number of occurrences N = k N k , it would be natural to say that the probability of the observation O j is the fraction of the number of its occurrences, P (O j ) = N j /N. However, theories of eternal inflation (Linde, 1986; Garcia-Bellido et al., 1994; Vilenkin, 1995a,b; Guth, 2000; Tegmark 2005; Aguirre, 2007; De Simone et al., 2008; Linde & Noorbala, 2010; Bousso et al., 2010) suggest that the universe may have expanded to become infinitely large, in which case most of the numbers N j of occurrences are infinite, and the ratio N j /N is ambiguous. Therefore, a lot of work has gone into different proposed schemes for regularizing the infinities.
I have pointed out that even in finite universes, quantum uncertainties in the numbers of occurrences also leads to ambiguities in the probabilities of observations (Page, 2008 (Page, , 2009a (Page, ,b,c, 2010 . In particular, I have shown that Born's rule does not work in the sense that the operators A j cannot be projection operators, so that one must choose other operators, and the ambiguity of that choice is the measure problem. The ambiguity occurs even for finite universes, but it is particularly severe for infinite universes. So whether or not the operators A j whose expectation values give the the probabilities of observations are interpreted to be awareness operators in Sensible Quantum Mechanics or Mindless Sensationalism (in which the observations are conscious perceptions), it is now recognized that there is the challenge of finding these operators, in addition to the challenge of finding the dynamics or algebra of all operators and the quantum state.
In conclusion, I am proposing that Sensible Quantum Mechanics or Mindless Sensationalism is the best framework we have for understanding the connection between consciousness and the quantum universe. Of course, the framework would only become a complete theory once one had the set of all conscious experiences, the awareness operators, and the quantum state of the universe.
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